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Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and weakly dominated




We examine the relation between coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) and weakly
dominated strategies in games with strategic substitutes (SS) and monotone externalities (ME). We show that
in 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive games with SS and ME, every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with
undominated strategies. We also find as a by-product that the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set
of undominated Nash equilibria in those games. The relation between the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
and weakly dominated strategies in games with SS is completely different from that in games with strategic
complements.
Keywords: Coalition-proof Nash equilibirum; Undominated strategies; Aggregative games; Strategic substi-
tutes.
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1 Introduction
A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987), has been widely applied to many eco-
nomic games such as oligopoly markets, public good provision, and political competition, voting, and so forth.1
Hence, clarifying properties of the equilibrium will benefit the economic analysis. In this study, we examine
the relation between undominated strategies and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in a game with strategic sub-
stitutes. Table 1 provides a simple example in which the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium consists of dominated
strategies.
Example 1 Consider the two-player game in Table 1. In the example, (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) is coalition-proof, but 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) is weakly
dominated by 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 , respectively).
Shinohara (2019) points out that even under conditions of monotone externalities and strategic complements,
which are familiar in the analysis of economics, the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium may be dominated (see
Example 1 of Shinohara (2019)). Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) examine the robustness of solutions to payoff per-
turbations and suggest that refined equilibria should preferably be an undominated Nash equilibrium. From the
∗Department of Economics, Hosei University, 4342 Aihara-machi, Machida, Tokyo, 194-0298, Japan. Tel: (81)-42-783-2534. Fax: (81)-42-
783-2611. E-mail: ryusukes@hosei.ac.jp
1See Thoron (1998), Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004), and Delgado and Moreno (2004) for the application to oligopoly markets, Laussel
and Le Breton (1998) and Shinohara (2010a) for the application to public good provision, Messener and Polborn (2007) and Quartieri and
Shinohara (2016) for the application to voting and political competition.
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viewpoint of Dekel and Fudenberg (1990), Shinohara (2019) provides a new equilibrium concept called the un-
dominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, which incorporates the undominated-strategy property in coalition-
proofness. He shows the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a game with conditions of strategic
complements and monotone externalities.
The focus of this study is on the relation between undominated strategies and coalition-proof Nash equilibria
in a game with strategic substitutes. We consider this relation on the class of 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive games with strategic
substitutes and monotone externalities. This class of games is introduced by Quartieri and Shinohara (2015)
and it includes games that are frequently studied in economic analysis (see Quartieri and Shinohara, 2015).
Quartieri and Shinohara (2015) show the equivalence between the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and the
Nash equilibrium in this class of games. However, whether the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium consists of
undominated strategies has not been studied.
We show that in every 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with strategic substitutes and monotone externalities, every
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium consists of undomiated strategies. This is shown in an interesting way me-
diated with the undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Shinohara (2019). First, we show that in the
game, the set of Nash equilibria and that of undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincide (Lemma 1).
Second, by using the first result, we show that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set
of undominated Nash equilibria (Proposition 1). As a by-product of the first and second results, we find that the
sets of the Nash equilibrium, the undominated Nash equilibrium, the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, and the
undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium all coincide in this game (Corollary 1).
The relation between the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and undominated strategies have been studies by
several researchers. Moreno and Wooders (1996) and Milgrom and Roberts (1996) investigate the relation of the
equilibriumwith the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies and show that if there exists a profile of
serially undominated strategies that Pareto-dominates the other serially undominated strategies, it is a coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the working paper by Shinohara (2010b) examines the relation between the
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and the iterative elimination ofweakly dominated strategies. Shinohara (2010b)
clarifies that when the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies is adopted, a Pareto-superior serially
undominated Nash equilibrium is not necessarily coalition-proof. His contribution is to establish a sufficient con-
dition under which the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium survives the iterative elimination of weakly dominated
strategies. By applying his result, we find that if a game satisfies strategic substitutes and monotone externalities
and further the set of strategies is finite for every player, then the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium consists of
undominated strategies. The result of the present study generalizes his result because the games considered
in the present study satisfies more general conditions of strategic substitutes and monotone externalities and,
more importantly, we do not assume that the strategy set is finite. Peleg (1998) examines the relation between
the equilibrium and dominant strategies. Pointing out that the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium may consist
of weakly dominated strategies, he shows that almost all dominant-strategy equilibria are coalition-proof; thus,
such equilibria consist of undominated strategies. In our class of games, a dominant-strategy equilibrium does
not necessarily exist.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the preliminaries. Section 3 provides




2.1 Strategic substitutes and monotone externalities in 𝝈𝝈𝝈𝝈-interactive games
A strategic-form game is a list Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ), in which 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a finite and nonempty set of players and,
for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ ∅ is the set of strategies of player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 :
∏
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 → R is player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s payoff function.2 A
subset of 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is called a coalition. For each coalition 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , the set of strategy profiles for coalition 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is denoted
by 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ≡
∏
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . A typical element of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is denoted by 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 . Using this notation, we can express 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =
(
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
)
for each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . If a coalition is a singleton (that is, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = {𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} for some 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ), then we simply denote its strategy
profile by 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and its set of strategy profiles 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Hereafter, the complement of coalition {𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} is denoted by −𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , not
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}, for simplicity.
Let 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 → 2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote the best response correspondence of player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 : For each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ,
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≡ argmax
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧∈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) .
We do not restrict the player’s best response strategies to being unique.
We focus on a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game, which is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A game Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) is a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game if
1. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⊆ R for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and
2. For each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , there exists a function 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 → R such that 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is non-decreasing in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ( 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and constant
in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; for all 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠), then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠).
In this game, players’ strategies are real numbers. For each player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 “aggregates” strategies of the players
other than 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . The aggregated value of the strategies through 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , not their composition, affects player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s payoff.
One of the examples of function 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) =
∑
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . Under this function, player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s payoff depends on its own
strategy 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the sum of the others’ strategies, as in the standard Cournot oligopoly game and the public good
game.
We consider a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game in which every player’s best response correspondence is “non-increasing”
and players’ payoff functions are monotonic.
Definition 2 A 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive strategic substitutes (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS) if
for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , all 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , all 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠), and all𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠),
if 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)𝑁𝑁 then 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
Definition 3
• A 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game Γ = [𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-increasing externalities (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE) if for all 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and
all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≤ 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠), then𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≤ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). A 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game Γ = [𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] satisfies
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-decreasing externalities (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE) if [𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (−𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] is a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE.
• A 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game Γ = [𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-monotone externalities (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME) if Γ satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE or
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE.
The conditions of strategic substitutes and monotone externalities are defined in terms of the aggregated
value by 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS requires that the best response strategies for player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 are non-increasing with regard to
aggregated values by function 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME requires that the payoff function of player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is monotonic with
regard to aggregated values by function 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
2The model in this study is based on that in Quartieri and Shinohara (2015).
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Our focus is limited to pure-strategies. Quartieri and Shinohara (2015) present several examples of games
of economic interest that satisfy 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME. They show examples that have multiple pure-strategy Nash
equilibria. Hence, the class of our games also possibly includes games with multiple equilibria.
2.2 Equilibrium concepts
The Nash equilibrium is defined as usual.
Definition 4 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) be a game. A strategy profile 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for
Γ if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . The set of Nash equilibria for Γ is denoted by 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (Γ).
In Definition 5, we introduce the notions of undominated strategies and Nash equilibria.
Definition 5
• In Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ), 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is weakly dominated by 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 if 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) for all 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
and 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) for some 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Strategy 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is undominated in Γ if no player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s strategy
weakly dominates 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Let 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be the set of player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s undominated strategies in Γ.
• A strategy profile 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) for Γ if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is undominated for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is a Nash equilibrium for Γ. The set of undominated Nash equilibria for Γ is denoted by𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (Γ).
For preparation to introduce coalition-proof Nash equilibria, we introduce a notion of induced games.
Definition 6 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ). For all𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and all 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , the game Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑁𝑁 (?̃?𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )
is the game induced by 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 at 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 in which ?̃?𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 → R is the payoff function of player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 such that ?̃?𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) ≡
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) for all 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 .
A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, introduced in Bernheim et al. (1987), is as follows. This is recursively
defined with regard to the number of players in coalitions by using the induced games.
Definition 7 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) be a game. If |𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 | = 1, then 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium (CP-NE) for Γ if and only if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (Γ). As the induction hypothesis, we assume that |𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 | ≥ 2 and
that a CP-NE has been defined for games with fewer than |𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 | players. Then,
• 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a self-enforcing strategy for Γ if it is a CP-NE for Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 for all nonempty 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ⊊ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ;
• 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a CP-NE for Γ if it is self-enforcing for Γ and there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 for Γ that strongly Pareto dominates 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 in Γ: 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
The set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria in Γ is denoted by 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (Γ).
We now introduce an undominated coalition-proof NE (UCP-NE) by incorporating the condition that players
take undominated strategies into the original definition of CP-NE (Bernheim et al., 1987). The equilibrium is
introduced by Shinohara (2019).
Definition 8 An undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (UCP-NE) for Γ is defined by induction with
respect to the number of members in a coalition. First, define a UCP-NE for single-player coalitions.
1. Let 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Strategy 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a UCP-NE for Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ argmax𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
Next, define a UCP-NE for a coalition with more than one player.
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Ryusuke Shinohara
2. Let 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 be such that |𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 | ≥ 2, and let 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 . As an induction hypothesis, a UCP-NE is defined in the
restricted games in which 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is the set of players for all 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ⊊ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 .
(a) 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is undominated self-enforcing (U-self-enforcing) for Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 if, for all 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ⊊ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is a UCP-NE for
Γ | (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶\𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
∗
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 .
(b) 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is a UCP-NE for Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is U-self- enforcing in Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and there is no U-self-enforcing 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 for
Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 such that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 .
If 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∗ ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is defined as a UCP-NE for Γ. Let 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ) be the set of undominated coalition-proof Nash
equilibria for Γ.
Remark 1 We immediately obtain the following properties from the definitions of the equilibria.
(i) In every game Γ, every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ) ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ).
(ii) In every game Γ, every undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium: 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ) ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ).
(iii) In every game Γ, every undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium: 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ) ⊆
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ) ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ).
(iv) Let 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 be a strategy profile and𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ⊊ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 be a coalition. Let 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 be a UCP-NE in Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 . Then, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 must
be a Nash equilibrium in Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 .
(v) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ) and 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ) are not always related by inclusion relation (see, for example, Example 1 of
Shinohara (2019)).
3 Results
Lemma 1 shows the equivalence between Nash equilibria and uncominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria for
any 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME.
Lemma 1 If Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) is a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, then
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ) = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (Γ).
Proof. Suppose that IE holds. From the definitions of the Nash equilibrium and UCP-NE, it is immediately
apparent that every UCP-NE is a Nash equilibrium in Γ. Next, we show that every Nash equilibrium is a UCP-
NE. Suppose, to the contrary, that 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a Nash equilibrium, but not a UCP-NE for Γ. Then, there exist a
coalition 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and a U-self-enforcing strategy profile 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 such that
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. (1)
Suppose that there exists 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 such that 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) ≤ 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). Then, 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) since 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is constant
in 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s strategies. We find that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) since 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is a Nash equilibrium. We further find from 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) ≥
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) and IE that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ). Finally, we obtain the result that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ), which
contradicts (1). Thus, it follows that
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) > 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. (2)
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Suppose that 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 . Then, by the non-decreasing property of 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , we find that 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) ≤ 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)
for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , which contradicts (2). Thus,
there exists 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 such that 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 > 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . (3)
By the definition of UCP-NE, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 must be a Nash equilibrium for Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (see (iii) and (iv) of Remark 1). Thus, for
the player 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is a best reply to (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ): 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ). Finally, from 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS, we obtain the result that 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠),
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ), and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) > 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) imply 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≥ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . This contradicts (3).
The proof when DE holds is similar. ■
Proposition 1 If Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) is a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, then
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ).
Proof. By Theorem 1 of Quartieri and Shinohara (2015), 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) holds. In addition, by Lemma
1, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) holds. Finally, by the defitions of UCP-NE, NE and UNE, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) ⊆
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) (see Remark 1). Thus, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ). ■
Wefinally obtain the following corollary immediately fromLemma 1, Proposition 1, and the result of Quartieri
and Shinohara (2015).
Corollary 1 If Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) is a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, then
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ) = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (Γ).
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and -ME are crucial for the property that every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium always consists of
undominated strategies, which is exemplified in the following examples.
Example 1 continued. In this example, we additionally assume that 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∈ R such that 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 and 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 .
Then, 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE is satisfied while 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS is not satisfied. As we already see, strategy profile (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) is a unique CP-NE,
but 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 are weakly dominated.
Example 2 Consider the game in Table 2, in which 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∈ R and 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 < 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 . This
game satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS, but does not satisfy 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME. Strategy profile (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) is the only CP-NE, but it consists of weakly
dominated strategies. Strategies 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 and 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 are also weakly dominated strategies.




𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 0, 40 40, 40 40, 40
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 10, 41 45, 40 40, 35
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 20, 38 50, 30 40, 20
Finally, we discuss the difference in the results between games with strategic complements and games with
strategic substitutes. Whether CP-NE consists of undominated strategies in games with strategic complements
is examined by Shinohara (2019). He examines this in the framework of quasi-super modular games, which are
games with strategic complements because the best response correspondence of every player is non-decreasing
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with regard to the other players’ strategies in the games. We summarize the results of Shinohara (2019) as
follows:
(C.1) Weakly dominated strategies may constitute a CP-NE.
(C.2) The set of CP-NE and that of UCP-NE both exist, but they may not be related by inclusion.
(C.3) The set of UCP-NE is a subset of the set of UNE. However, they do not necessarily coincide.
We can observe the above three points from Example 1 of Shinohara (2019).
In contrast to the above properties, we obtain the following properties in games with strategic substitutes:
(S.1) Every CP-NE always consists of undominated strategies.
(S.2) The set of CP-NE and that of UCP-NE always coincide.
(S.3) The set of UCP-NE always coincides with the set of UNE.
Thus, the relation between CP-NE and undominated strategies is completely different between games with
strategic complements and games with strategic substitutes. If we consider that the refinement of Nash equilib-
ria should consist of undominated strategies, as Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) discuss, then CP-NE satisfies this
property in games with strategic substitutes. Unlike in the games with strategic complements, we do not have
to consider UCP-NE.
4 Conclusion
We examine whether coalition-proof Nash equilibria take undominated strategies in games with strategic sub-
stitutes and monotone externalities. In contrast to the results in games with strategic complements by Shinohara
(2019), we show that every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is an undominated Nash equilibrium; hence, the
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium never consists of weakly dominated strategies in games with strategic sub-
stitutes. We also find as a by-product that the set of Nash equilibria coincides with that of undominated Nash
equilibria in those games.
Although the conditions of strategic substitutes and strategic complements capture many situations which
are frequently examined in the economic analysis, there are also many games of economic applications which
cannot be captured by those two conditions. Thus, as a future work, it would be interesting to explore the
relation between the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and the undominated strategies in other classes of games.
Acknowledgments I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the KAKENHI Grant-in-Aid for Scien-
tific Research (C) No. 18K01519.
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